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WHERE HAS THE CURRENCY GONE? AND WHY? 
THE UNDERGROUND ECONOMY AND PERSONAL INCOME 
TAX EVASION IN THE U.S., 1970-2008  
 
   By Richard J. Cebula, Jacksonville University 
 
Abstract 
Unaccounted for currency in the U.S. is argued to reflect the presence of widespread income tax 
evasion. This empirical study seeks to identify determinants of the underground economy in the 
U.S. in the form of federal personal income tax evasion over the period 1970-2008. In this study, 
we use the most recent data available on personal income tax evasion, data that are derived from the 
General Currency Ratio Model and measured in the form of the ratio of unreported AGI (adjusted 
gross income) to reported AGI. Other studies of federal income tax evasion for the U.S. are dated 
and do not use data this current. It is found that personal income tax evasion was an increasing 
function of the maximum marginal federal personal income tax rate, the percentage of federal 
personal income tax returns characterized by itemized deductions, and unpopular military 
engagements, in this case, the War in Iraq, and a decreasing function of the Tax Reform Act of 
1986 (during its first two years of being implemented), the ratio of the tax free interest rate yield on 
high grade municipals to the interest rate yield on ten year Treasury notes (as a measure of the 
incentive effect of a better return to tax avoidance, which is legal), and higher audit rates of filed 
federal income tax returns (as a measure of risk from tax evasion) by IRS personnel.  
  
J.E.L. classifications: G18, G28, H26 
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I. Introduction 
 
U.S. households and firms admit to holding only about 15% of the total known stock of U.S. 
currency outside the banking system (Cebula, 2011). It is suspected that much of this disparity 
between the actual size of the stock of currency in the U.S. and the accounted for (admitted to) 
holdings of U.S. currency is attributable to the currency’s being used in transactions that are not 
reported to the IRS (Feige, 2009). In other words, unaccounted for currency in the U.S. is argued 
to reflect the presence of the so-called “underground economy” in the form of widespread 
personal income tax evasion.  
Income tax evasion effectively consists of taxable income that is either unreported or 
underreported to the IRS; it also can consist of spurious, fabricated, or exaggerated tax deductions. 
Studies of income tax evasion behavior essentially fall into three categories. First, there are the 
principally theoretical models of tax evasion behavior, such as Allingham and Sandmo (1972), 
Falkinger (1988), Klepper, Nagin, and Spurr (1991), Das-Gupta (1994), Pestieau, Possen, and 
Slutsky (1994), Caballe and Panades (1997). As a rule, most such studies are not empirical in 
nature. Second, there are a number of studies that either (a) use questionnaires or (b) undertake 
experiments, such as Spicer and Lundstedt (1976), Spicer and Thomas (1982), Baldry (1987), Alm, 
Jackson, and McGee (1992), Thurman (1991), and Alm, McClelland, and Schulze (1999). These 
2 
 
 2 
studies are empirical in nature, deriving the data largely (if not entirely) from the experiments. 
Certain of these studies indicate an aversion to the prospect of being audited while others reveal a 
lack of such risk-averse behavior; still others imply that taxpayers may be averse to tax evasion on 
moral grounds. Additionally, the incentive to evade taxation by underreporting income provided by 
higher marginal income tax rates is also revealed in several of these studies. Third, there are those 
studies that largely or in some cases exclusively adopt what is referred to as "official data,” i.e., data 
obtained from the IRS (or its counterpart outside of the U.S.) and/or some other “official source,” 
i.e., a government agency. Among, the types of information thusly obtained and analyzed are data 
on income tax evasion, income tax rates, and audit rates. Such studies endeavor typically either 
seek to estimate the aggregate degree of tax evasion or to identify the determinants thereof (Tanzi, 
1982, 1983; Clotfelter, 1983; Carson, 1984; Pyle, 1989; Erard and Feinstein, 1994; Feige, 1994, 
1989, 1996; Cebula, 2001, 2004, 2008, 2011; Ali, Cecil, and Knoblett, 2001; Ledbetter, 2004; Alm 
and Yunus, 2009; Cebula and Coombs, 2009; Cebula, Coombs, and Yang, 2009).    
In this literature, it is widely believed that the degree of federal personal income tax evasion 
in the economy as a whole is positively affected by income tax rates (Tanzi, 1982; Clotfelter, 1983; 
Feige, 1994). Interestingly, Yaniv (1994) characterizes Clotfelter (1983) as “the most relevant 
study” with respect to the impact of income tax rates on tax evasion, whereas Cox (1984) questions 
his findings. In any event, this perspective is simple: the higher the income tax rate, the greater the 
benefit (in terms of a reduced tax liability) from not reporting taxable income, ceteris paribus. It is 
also widely accepted that the greater the risk associated with underreporting or not reporting 
taxable income, the less the degree to which economic agents will choose either to not report or to 
underreport their taxable income (Friedland, 1982; Spicer and Thomas, 1985; De Juan, 1989; 
Errard and Feinstein, 1994; Cebula and Coombs, 2009). 
This study seeks to add to the rich literature on income tax evasion by identifying key 
determinants of federal personal income tax evasion using data up to and including the year 2008. 
With the exception of a single study, the most recent year of tax evasion behavior in the U.S. that 
has been formally studied is 2005 (Cebula, 2011); for the most part, earlier studies of the U.S. do 
not go beyond the year 1997. Thus, by investigating tax evasion through 2008, the study period is 
more current than the existing published literature. The framework/model is presented in Section II. 
Section III provides the formal empirical analysis, whereas Section IV provides a summary of the 
study findings and certain policy observations.   
 
II. A Benefit-Cost Model of Under-Reporting Taxable Income 
 
In this study, the relative probability that the representative economic agent will under-report 
his/her taxable income to the IRS (pur) is treated as an increasing function of the expected gross 
benefits to the agent of under-reporting taxable income, egb, and as a decreasing function of the 
expected gross costs to the agent of under-reporting taxable income, egc. Thus, the ratio of the 
probability of under-reporting taxable income to the IRS, pur, to the probability of fully reporting 
taxable income1 to the IRS, (1-pur), is described for the representative economic agent by: 
 
pur/(1-pur) = f(egb, egc), such that fegb > 0, fegc < 0     (1) 
                     
1 Fully reporting all taxable income is complete income tax compliance. 
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Expressing the probabilities described in equation (1) in relative terms possesses the virtue that it 
thereby reflects the form of the tax evasion data, i.e., data where (as described below in Section III) 
the aggregate degree of federal personal income tax evasion is expressed in such relative terms. 
 
The Expected Gross Benefits of Under-Reporting Taxable Income 
 
The expected benefits of income tax evasion arguably can assume two different forms: expected 
direct benefits and expected secondary benefits. Expected primary or direct benefits of income tax 
evasion can be regarded as obvious or transparent. Expected secondary benefits are less tangible but 
can nonetheless be very real. 
 
a. Expected Direct Benefits of Under-Reporting Taxable Income 
 
The best example of direct benefits from income tax evasion would be the value of the taxes not 
paid to the IRS. To the extent that an individual engages in income tax evasion and underpays 
income taxes by, say, $X, those $X are a direct benefit to the individual, who can (in theory) spend 
and/or save the $X. It follows that the higher the marginal federal income tax rate that the 
individual is subject to, the greater the pecuniary direct benefit from underreporting his or her 
income and/or from exaggerating tax deductions by any given amount. For instance, if the 
maximum marginal income tax rate is 10 percent, tax evasion in the amount of $5000 would be 
expected to directly yield the tax evader $500; however, if the individual faced a 40 percent income 
tax rate, the expected direct benefit of this degree of tax evasion would be $2,000. Thus, it is logical 
to deduce that, ceteris paribus, the higher the maximum marginal income tax rate faced by a 
taxpayer, the greater the incentive to engage in income tax evasion because the higher that income 
tax rate, the greater the expected benefits of the tax evasion behavior.  
 It is standard in the tax evasion literature to hypothesize that the gross expected direct benefits 
from not reporting income to the IRS are an increasing function of the federal personal income tax 
rate (Tanzi, 1982; Clotfelter, 1983; Feige, 1994). To reflect the federal personal income tax rate, 
this study adopts the maximum marginal federal personal income tax rate (MAXMARGTX). This 
measure of the income tax rate is adopted because it can be argued that it not only is an actual 
income tax rate but also reflects to some degree the extent to which the income tax rate schedule at 
any point in time is progressive. 
In the U.S., Form A of Schedule 1040 provides a variety of itemized deductions types that 
enable the taxpayer ultimately to directly reduce his/her taxable income. These include allowances 
for medical expenses, state and local government taxes, mortgage interest payments, charitable 
contributions, and other such outlays. The larger the pecuniary value of these deductions, the lower 
the taxable income of the taxpayer. Furthermore, given the rather varied, numerous, and sometimes 
complex forms of these deductions, and given the limited ability for the IRS to verify many of these 
itemized deductions, taxpayers filing their tax returns and claiming itemized deductions have an 
opportunity to derive direct tax benefits by overstating their itemized deductions. Thus, it is 
hypothesized that the greater the proportion of taxpayers who itemize their tax deductions 
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(PCTITEM),2 the greater the degree to which itemized deductions are exaggerated and hence the 
greater the direct expected benefits of federal personal income tax evasion/under-reporting taxable 
income. Interestingly, this variable, which reduces taxable income, has been effectively ignored in 
the official tax evasion literature to date. 
Whereas higher income tax rates and the opportunity to claim exaggerated itemized deductions 
can yield expected direct tangible benefits from income tax evasion, there is at least one course of 
action that can tangibly reduce the expected direct benefits of income tax evasion. Moreover, it is a 
legal course of action, namely, it is legal tax avoidance. One avenue through which this course of 
action is made possible in the U.S. is the existence of the municipal bond market, where qualified 
bonds issued by cities, counties, and states in the U.S. pay interest that is free from federal income 
taxation to the owners of record of such bonds.3 In particular, following Cebula (2004), it can be 
argued that the greater the ratio of tax free interest rate yield on high grade municipals relative to 
taxable interest rate yield such as that on 10-year U.S. Treasury notes, TFTEN, the greater the 
benefits of tax avoidance, which is legal, and hence the less the expected direct benefits of tax 
evasion, which of course is illegal.   
  
b. Expected Secondary Benefits of Under-Reporting Taxable Income 
 
Aside from the issues of tax rates and itemization of deductions, persons who have taxable income 
may be able in certain cases to derive secondary benefits from income tax evasion behavior, i.e., 
from under-reporting taxable income. For example, if people disapprove of the way in which the 
federal government is spending their tax dollars, they may be angered or frustrated. To relieve this 
anger and/or frustration, they may consider income tax evasion as a means of expressing this anger 
and/or frustration (Feige, 1994).  
Consider the case of the U.S. military being engaged in an unpopular war. For example, there is 
empirical evidence (Cebula, 2001) that the unpopularity of the Vietnam War so angered the public 
that many chose to underreport their income and/or exaggerate their itemized tax deductions. This 
form of income tax evasion behavior was undertaken because of the disapproval by much of the 
U.S. public of the U.S. involvement in and expenditures to finance the Vietnam War using their tax 
dollars. As the Vietnam War raged on, at least some portion of the public received secondary 
benefits/gains from the experience that they were withholding financing of that military action.  
       Similarly, it is hypothesized in the present study that the U.S. military involvement in Iraq, i.e., 
the War in Iraq (IRAQWAR), that began in 2003 and was still raging on through and beyond the end 
of the study period for the present study was very unpopular with the U.S. populace as a whole. 
Indeed, Cebula, Cook, and Issa (2007), found strong empirical evidence that the War in Iraq was 
very unpopular with a large percentage of the U.S. population. Hence, the War in Iraq is 
hypothesized here to have created a circumstance for people to express their dis-satisfaction by 
engaging in a greater degree of income tax evasion that yielded them a secondary gain from such. 
Thus, the expected gross direct and secondary benefits from income tax evasion are expressed 
                     
2 Instead of claiming the “standard deduction.” 
3 In states which impose a state income tax, there is an exemption from those state taxes for 
state residents purchasing qualified tax-exempt bonds issued within that state (the so-called “dual 
exemption”). 
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as: 
 egb =  egb (MAXMARGTX, PCTITEM, TFTEN, IRAQWAR)    (2) 
c. Expected Gross Costs of Under-Reporting Taxable Income      
 
The expected gross costs of not reporting or under-reporting taxable income to the IRS and/or of 
reporting exaggerated itemized deductions to the IRS are hypothesized to be an increasing function 
of the expected risks/costs thereof (Pestieau, Possen and Slutsky, 1994; Erard and Feinstein, 1994; 
Caballe and Panades, 1997). In this study, to the representative economic agent, the expected 
risks/costs from from underreporting taxable income to the IRS are enhanced by an increase in 
AUDIT, the percentage of filed federal personal income tax returns that is formally audited by IRS 
examiners/personnel, ceteris paribus. Indeed, the experience of an IRS tax audit could imply non-
pecuniary ("psychic") costs (such as psychological stress) as well as direct pecuniary costs 
(including outlays for attorneys and/or other representation such as accountants or financial 
advisors, along with the value of one's own time) above and beyond any potential added taxes, 
penalties, and interest assessed by the IRS. Hence, this study adopts the probability of a formal 
audit as a measure of risk to the would-be tax evader.4  
Hence, the expected gross costs of engaging in income tax evasion is represented in this 
study by: 
  
 egc = egc (AUDIT)         (3) 
 
d. A Control Variable: The Tax Reform Act of 1986  
 
In 1987, Musgrave observed (1987, p. 59), “The Tax Reform Act of 1986 is the most sweeping 
reform since the early 1940s…” Indeed, the TRA [Tax Reform Act] did introduce a number of 
reforms, many of which are outlined in broad terms in Barth (1991), Barth and Brumbaugh (1992), 
Ott and Vegari (2003), and Sanger, Sirmans, and Turnbull (1990). For example, as observed in Ott 
and Vegari (2003, p. 279), “The Act introduced major cuts in the personal tax rate. When fully 
effective (1988), only two tax brackets set at 15 and 28 percent, were to replace the 14 bracket tax 
schedule with rates in the range of 11 to 50 percent...[while it] broadened the tax base by reducing 
the itemized deduction.” Furthermore, as Barth (1991, pp. 45, 124) observes, among other things, 
under the TRA the 10 percent investment tax credit for the purchase of equipment was repealed, and 
the “life” of the investment was increased for depreciation purposes. Thus, it is hypothesized here 
that at the time the TRA was being enacted and being fully implemented (1986-1987), there were 
many complex and new provisions added to the U.S. Internal Revenue Code. Consequently, 
taxpayers in general, including would–be tax evaders, were unfamiliar with the sweeping changes 
in IRS policies. It logically follows that not only honest taxpayers but also those contemplating 
income tax evasion required time to climb the “learning curve” associated with the TRA, resulting 
in at least some temporary tempering of the aggregate degree of federal personal income tax 
                     
4 Ideally, IRS penalty assessments could also be adopted as a measure of the risk associated with 
tax evasion; unfortunately, a dependable and complete set of penalty data is not available for all the 
years in the study period. 
 
6 
 
 6 
evasion. The temporary decline is attributable to the fact that it would likely take at least some time 
for taxpayers to adequately understand and make adjustments to the newly revised Internal Revenue 
Code. Consequently, it is hypothesized here that, for the period when the TRA was initially 
implemented, 1986, through the year the TRA became “de facto fully effective,” 1987 (Barth, 1991; 
Barth and Brumbaugh, 1992), the value of egb was reduced. Accordingly, (2) above is replaced by 
(4): 
 
egb =  egb (MAXMARGTX, PCTITEM, TFTEN, IRAQWAR, TRA)   (4) 
 
e. The Synthesized Model  
 
To express the full model, simply requires substituting from equations (3) and (4) into equation (1) 
yielding:  
 
pur/(1-pur) = f(MAXMARGTX, PCTITEM, TFTEN, IRAQWAR, TRA, AUDIT) (5) 
 
 Let AGI represent the actual total value of the aggregate federal adjusted gross income in 
the economy, i.e., AGI=UAGI+RAGI, where UAGI is the dollar size of the unreported aggregate 
federal adjusted gross income in the economy,5 and RAGI is the dollar size of the reported 
aggregate federal adjusted gross income in the economy. It logically follows that the relative 
degree of aggregate income tax evasion can be given by: (pur)/(1-pur) = UAGI/RAGI. Thus, it 
follows that equation (5) can be replaced by equation (6): 
 
UAGI/RAGI = f (MAXMARGTX, PCTITEM, TFTEN, IRAQWAR, TRA, AUDIT) (6) 
 
Equation (6) constitutes the foundation for the empirical model considered in the next Section of 
this study.6 For the convenience of the reader, Table 1 summarizes the expected impact of each of 
these explanatory variable on income tax evasion. 
 
III. Empirical Analysis 
 
a. The Basic Reduced-Form Empirical Model  
  
Based on the framework provided in equation (6) above, the following reduced-form 
equation is to be estimated initially: 
 
(UAGI/RAGI)t = a0 + a1 MAXMARGTXt-1 + a2 PCTITEMt-1 + a3 TFTENt-1 + a4 IRAQWARt 
                     
5 For an explanation of how unreported adjusted gross income is calculated using the General 
Currency Ratio model, see Feige (2009). 
6 Clearly, UAGI = (pur)*AGI  and RAGI = (1-pur)*AGI. It then follows that:  
UAGI/RAGI = (pur)*AGI/(1-pur)*AGI = (pur)/(1-pur). Substitution of UAGI/RAGI for pur/(1-pur) 
in (5) yields: UAGI/RAGI = f (MAXMARGTX, PCTITEM, TFTEN, IRAQWAR, TRA, AUDIT), 
which is equation (6).  
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 + a5 TRAt + a6 AUDITt-1 + u             (7) 
 
where:  
(UAGI/RAGI)t = the ratio of the aggregate unreported federal adjusted gross income in year t to 
the aggregate reported federal adjusted gross income in year t, expressed as a percent; 
a0 = constant term; 
MAXMARGTXt-1 = the maximum marginal federal personal income tax rate in year t-1, expressed as 
a percent; 
PCTITEMt-1 = the percentage of federal personal income tax returns that included Schedule A, 
itemizing deductions, in year t-1; 
TFTENt-1 = the ratio of the average interest rate yield on high grade tax free municipal bonds in year 
t-1 to the average interest rate yield on 10-year Treasury notes in year t-1, expressed as a 
percentage; 
IRAQWARt = a binary (dummy) variable for the 2003 through 2008, during which the U.S. was 
involved in the war in Iraq; IRAQWARt = 1 for the year 2003 through 2008 and IRAQWARt = 0 
otherwise;  
TRAt = a binary (dummy) variable for the years 1986 and 1987: TRAt =1 for the years 1986, 1987 
and TRAt =0 otherwise; 
AUDITt-1 = the percentage of filed federal personal income tax returns in year t-1 that was subjected 
to a formal IRS audit involving IRS examiners; and 
u = stochastic error term.  
The study period runs from 1970 through 2008, reflecting availability of the data used in the 
analysis. The data are annual. For the interested reader, descriptive statistics for the study period for 
each of the variables are found in Table 2. Finally, a group unit root test (which assumes a common 
unit root process) reveals that the variables in the model are stationary in levels over the study 
period.7 
The series adopted to measure income tax evasion, in this case represented by the variable 
(UAGI/RAGI), were obtained from Feige (2009). Based on the General Currency Ratio (GCR) 
model, Feige (2009) estimated the ratio of aggregate unreported adjusted gross income to aggregate 
reported adjusted gross income, using a 1973 IRS estimate for this ratio as the baseline in his 
computations. These data are provided in Table 3. The data for MAXMARGTX were obtained from 
the Internal Revenue Service (2010, Table 6). The AUDIT and PCTITEM data were obtained from 
the Government Accounting Office (1996: Table I.1) and the U.S. Census Bureau (1994, Table 
519; 1998, Table 550; 1999, Table 556; 2001, Table 546; 2010, Table 469). The data for the 
variable TFTEN were obtained from the Council of Economic Advisors (2010, Table B-73). The 
TRA and IRAQWAR variables are binary (dummy) variables; the Tax Reform Act of 1986 was 
actually signed into law by President Reagan in October of 1986.  
 
b. The Estimation Results 
 
In the linear estimation of equation (7) in column (a) of Table 4, all six of the estimated 
coefficients exhibit the expected signs. Furthermore, five of these estimated coefficients are 
                     
7 These results will be supplied upon written, i.e., e-mail, request. 
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statistically significant at the 1% level, and the remaining one is statistically significant at the 5% 
level. The coefficient of determination (R2) is 0.70, so that the model explains approximately  
seven-tenths of the variation in the independent variable. Based on the DW and Rho statistics, there 
is no concern regarding autocorrelation. Finally, the F-statistic is statistically significant at the 1% 
level, attesting to the overall strength of the model. 
According to the results provided column (a) of Table 4, the coefficient on the maximum 
marginal federal personal income tax rate variable (MAXMARGTX) is positive and statistically 
significant at the 1% level. Thus, as expected, the higher the maximum marginal federal personal 
income tax rate, the greater the expected benefits of tax evasion and hence the greater the extent of 
that income tax evasion. This finding is consistent with most previous studies of income tax 
evasion using official data (Ali, Cecil, and Knoblett, 2001; Cebula, 2001, 2004; Clotfelter, 1983; 
Feige, 1994; Klepper, Nagin, and Spurr, 1991; Tanzi, 1982, 1983).  
The estimated coefficient on the PCTITEM variable is positive and statistically significant 
at beyond the 5% level. This finding implies that the greater the percentage of taxpayers that 
itemizes their personal deductions (on Schedule A of Form 1040), the greater the degree to which 
taxable income is under-reported and hence the greater the degree of aggregate federal personal 
income tax evasion. This finding has not been researched in the literature to date.  
The estimated coefficient on the tax free/taxable interest rate variable, TFTEN, is negative, 
as hypothesized, and statistically significant at the 1% level, providing compelling empirical 
evidence that the greater the rewards for legal tax avoidance (as measured here), the less the 
aggregate degree of illegal personal income tax evasion. This finding is consistent with Cebula 
(2004), who first proposed and tested this hypothesis, albeit with data running only through the year 
1997.  
Consistent with the arguments in Musgrave (1987) and findings in Cebula, Coombs and 
Yang (2009), the results for TRA variable are compelling. In particular, the estimated coefficient on 
variable TRA is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. Thus, there is evidence that 
the Tax Reform Act of 1986 is shown to have reduced federal personal income tax evasion in the 
U.S., albeit only briefly. Given the specification of TRA as applying to the short-term period of just 
1986 and 1987, these results would seem to confirm the prior findings by Cebula, Coombs and 
Yang (2009), who argue that it would take at least some time for taxpayers to understand the 
revisions in the Internal Revenue Code and to adjust to those revisions.  
The estimated coefficient on the binary IRAQWAR variable is positive, as hypothesized, and 
statistically significant at the 1% level. Thus, it appears that taxpayers in the aggregate engage in 
increased federal personal income tax evasion when the U.S. is involved in an unpopular war. In 
principle, this finding is compatible with the empirical evidence in Cebula (2001), who found that 
the unpopularity of the Vietnam War so angered the U.S. public that many chose to underreport 
their income and/or exaggerate their tax deductions. It also is consistent with Cebula, Cook, and 
Issa (2007), who found strong empirical evidence that the War in Iraq was very unpopular with a 
large percentage of the U.S. population.  
Finally, there is the audit rate (by IRS examiners) variable. As shown in the first column of 
Table 4, the estimated coefficient on this variable is negative and statistically significant at 1% 
level. Thus, it appears that the audit rate variable (AUDIT), of and in itself, may be viewed as an 
effective deterrent to federal personal income taxation. This finding is consistent with previous  
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studies such as Pestieau, Possen and Slutsky (1994), Erard and Feinstein (1994), Caballe and 
Panades (1997), and Cebula (2001), who suggests that IRS policies such as a higher audit rate by 
IRS personnel impose a variety of costs, both pecuniary and psychic, that act to dissuade income 
tax evasion behavior.  
To test the consistency of the model and provide further insights into the issues at hand, the 
basic model in equation (7) was estimated next in semi-log form and then in log-log form. These 
empirical results can be found, respectively, in columns (b) and (c) of Table 4. Overall, all 12 of the 
estimated coefficients in columns (b) and (c) exhibit the expected signs and are statistically 
significant at the 5% level, and in most case, at beyond the 5% level. The F-statistics in both 
estimates are statistically significant at the 1% level, and the R2 values in both cases falls in the 
range of 0.70, thusly explain about seven-tenths of the variation in the dependent variable.  
In column (b) of Table 4, all six of the estimated coefficients exhibit the expected signs, 
with five being statistically significant at the 1% level and one being statistically significant at the 
5% level. Thus, in this semi-log estimation for the 1970-2008 study period, the underground 
economy in the form of income tax evasion in the U.S. was, paralleling the estimate in column (a), 
an increasing function of the maximum marginal federal income tax rate (at the 1% statistical 
significance level), the percentage of tax filers that itemized personal deductions (at the 5% 
statistical significance level), and the U.S. involvement in the War in Iraq (at the 1% statistical 
significance level). In addition, income tax evasion was, also paralleling the results in column (a), a 
decreasing function of the ratio of the tax-free interest rate yield on high grade municipal bonds to 
the taxable interest rate yield on 10-year U.S. treasury notes (at the 1% statistical significance level), 
the IRS audit rate by IRS examiners (at the 1% statistical significance level), and the Tax Reform 
Act (at the 1% statistical significance level). Thus, the semi-log estimate provides consistent 
support for the initial regression results and conclusions. 
Finally, there is the log-log estimate presented in column (c) of Table 4. In this estimate, 
each of the estimation results associated with an explanatory variable is an elasticity rather than a 
coefficient per se. In column (c), each of the six of the estimated elasticity values exhibits the 
expected sign. In addition, four of the estimated elasticity values are statistically significant at the 
1% level, one elasticity is statistically significant at the 2.5% level, and the remaining one is 
statistically significant at the 5% level. All of these findings parallel those in the linear and semi-log 
estimates found in columns (a) and (d) of Table 4.  
According to the findings shown in column (c) of Table 4, a 10% increase in the maximum 
marginal federal personal income tax rate would increase aggregate income tax evasion in the U.S. 
by 1.06%. Clearly, then, if this tax rate were increased, the actual tax revenue increase would be 
lower than forecast/expected. Next, a 10% increase in the percentage of tax returns filing with 
itemized deductions would raise personal federal income tax evasion by 3.56%. Clearly, the policy 
of allowing itemized deductions as currently practiced may warrant re-examination by the IRS and 
by policy-makers. On the other hand, if the TF/TEN ratio rises by 10%, there would be a 5.94% 
reduction in personal federal income tax evasion, implying that better incentives to avoid federal 
personal income taxation help to avert federal personal income tax evasion. The result for the tax 
reform variable implies that making a major change in the Internal Revenue Code may create 
challenges for would-be tax evaders that result in diminished tax evasion, albeit temporarily. 
Clearly, involvement in an unpopular war, such as the War in Iraq, acts to elevate income tax 
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evasion, apparently by about 11.8%, implying that that taxpayers experience a secondary gain from 
tax evasion when U.S. political leaders immerse the military in conflicts the U.S. public 
disapproves of (Feige, 1994; Cebula, 2011). Finally, there is the issue of IRS audits conducted by 
IRS examiners.8  The results in this log-log estimate imply that a 10% increase in this audit rate 
would reduce aggregate federal personal income tax evasion by 1.71%; thus, a more aggressive 
audit policy by the IRS could bear fruit in terms of added revenues, although the political 
unpopularity of such a policy mat restrict its implementation.  
 
IV. Summary and Closing Observations 
 
 This empirical study of the underground economy examines a new and updated series based 
on the General Currency Ratio (GCR) Model on personal income tax evasion for the period 1970 
through 2008, with 2008 being the most recent year for which income tax evasion data are available 
for the U.S. The IRS has data based on the AGI-gap approach; however, the most recent year for its 
data is 2005 (Internal Revenue Service, 2010, Table 6).9 Thus, the present study is more 
“contemporary” than previous studies using “official data.” 
 Adopting a cost-benefit model of income tax evasion decision-making, this study seeks to 
identify key determinants of aggregate federal personal income tax evasion (under-reporting of 
taxable income, including the exaggerating of itemized deductions, which reduces taxable income) 
in the U.S. over the study period. The principal conclusions are the following: federal personal 
income tax evasion is an increasing function of the maximum marginal federal personal income tax 
rate, the percentage of federal personal income tax returns that itemizes deductions, and U.S. 
involvement in the unpopular war, in this case, the War in Iraq. The study also finds that the Tax 
Reform Act of 1986 acted to briefly discourage tax evasion, whereas a higher IRS audit rate by IRS 
personnel acted to discourage tax evasion. Furthermore, the greater the benefits of legal tax 
avoidance, as measured by the ratio of the tax free interest rate yield on high grade municipals to 
the taxable interest rate yield on 10-year Treasury notes, the less the degree of illegal tax evasion.  
The findings imply, among other things, that increasing the maximum marginal federal 
personal income tax rate may not be the most efficient means of attempting to raise tax revenues. 
Furthermore, in the pursuit of greater tax revenues, limiting the ability to itemize personal tax 
deductions may be a fruitful path to consider; indeed, it was a significant component of the Tax 
Reform Act of 1986. However, it is a path requiring careful planning so as to avoid political fall-out 
with the taxpaying public. Obviously, avoidance of what is likely to be an unpopular war would be 
wise not only on moral, ethical, and political grounds, but also on the practical grounds of avoiding 
tax revenue losses. Finally, although increasing the IRS examiner audit rate may yield tax revenues, 
political pragmatism would seem to require a conservative implementation of such a policy change.  
In closing, it is observed that subsequent related research might seek to identify additional 
factors potentially influencing income tax evasion in the U.S., such as the minimum marginal 
federal personal income tax rate and the presence of undocumented immigrants within U.S. 
borders. In addition, future research might undertake an investigation of the possibility of 
simultaneity issues between tax evasion and other variables (Cebula, 2001; Alm and Yunus, 2009). 
                     
8 As opposed to audits performed by IRS computers.  
9 Cebula (2011) investigates tax evasion determinants through 2005 using this IRS data-set. 
11 
 
 11 
References 
 
Ali, M.M., Cecil, H.W. and Knoblett J.A. (2001). The effects of tax rates and enforcement policies 
on taxpayer compliance: A study of self-employed taxpayers. Atlantic Economic Journal, 
29(2), 186-202. 
Allingham, M.G., Sandmo, A. (1972). Income tax evasion. Journal of Public Economics, 1(3), 323-
338. 
Alm, J., Yunus, M. (2009). Spatiality and persistence in U.S. individual income tax  compliance. 
National Tax Journal, 62(1), 101-124. 
Alm, J., Jackson, B. and McKee, M. (1992). Institutional uncertainty and taxpayer compliance. 
American Economic Review, 82(4), 1018-1026. 
Baldry, J.C. (1987). Income tax evasion and the tax schedule: Some experimental results.  Public 
Finance / Finances Publiques, 42(2), 357-383. 
Barth, J.R. (1991). The great savings and loan debacle. Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise 
Institute.  
Barth, J.R., Brumbaugh, R.D. (1992). The reform of federal deposit insurance. New York: Harper 
Business. 
Bawley, D. (1982). The subterranean economy. New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Caballe, J., Panades, J. (1997). Tax evasion and economic growth. Public Finance / Finances 
Publiques, 52(3-4), 318-340. 
Carson, C. (1984). The underground economy: An introduction. Survey of Current Business, 64(1), 
24-35. 
Cebula, R.J. (2011). Aggregate income tax evasion: Empirical results from 2SLS estimation.         
International Economics, 68(4), 345-362. 
Cebula, R.J. (2001). Impact of income - detection technology and other factors on aggregate income 
tax evasion: The case of the United States. Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review, 
54(4), 401-415.  
Cebula, R.J. (2004). Income tax evasion revisited: The impact of interest rate yields on tax - free 
municipal bonds. Southern Economic Journal, 71(2), 418-423. 
Cebula, R.J., Cook, J., and Issa, T.A. (2007). Economics, wars, and scandals: Their Impacts on the 
US public approval ratings of its president over the long run, Journal of Applied Economics, 
6(3), 31-39.  
Cebula, R.J., Coombs, C. (2009). Do government - spending - induced federal budget deficits 
‘crowd out’ tax compliance in the U.S.? Tax Notes, 56(9), 1007-1012. 
Cebula, R.J., Coombs, C. and Yang, B.Z. (2009). The tax reform act of 1986: An assessment in 
terms of tax compliance behavior in the U.S., International Economics, 51(2), 247-259.  
Clotfelter, C.T. (1983). Tax evasion and tax rates: An analysis of individual returns. Review of 
Economics and Statistics, 65(2), 363-373. 
Council of Economic Advisors (2010). Economic Report of the President, 2010. Washington, D.C.: 
U.S. Government Printing Office. 
Cox, D. (1984). Raising revenue in the underground economy. National Tax Journal, 37(3), 283-
288. 
12 
 
 12 
Das-Gupta, A. (1994). A theory of hard - to - get groups. Public Finance/Finances Publiques, 49 
(Supplement), 28-39. 
De Juan, A. (1989). Fiscal Attitudes and Behavior: A Study of 16-35 year old Swedish citizens. 
Stockholm, Sweden: Stockholm School of Economics.  
Erard, B., Feinstein, J.S. (1994). The role of moral sentiments and audit perceptions in tax 
Compliance. Public Finance/Finances Publiques, 49 (Supplement), 70-89. 
Falkinger, J. (1988). Tax evasion and equity: A theoretical analysis. Public Finance/Finances 
Publiques, 43(3), 388-395. 
Feige, E.L. (2009). New estimates of overseas U. S. currency holdings, the underground economy, 
and the ‘tax gap’. Munich personal RePec archive, MPRA paper No. 30353. Munich, 
Germany: University Library of Munich.  
Feige, E.L. (1994). The underground economy and the currency enigma. Public Finance / Finances 
Publiques, 49 (Supplement), 119-136. 
Friedland, N. (1982). A note on tax evasion as a function of the quality of information about the 
credibility of threatened fines: Some preliminary research. Journal of Applied Psychology, 
12(1), 54-59. 
Government Accounting Office (1996). Individual Audit Rates. Available at: 
http://www.gao.gov/archive/1996/gg96091.pdf. 
Internal Revenue Service (2010). Aggregate Unreported Income Statistics. Available at: 
http://www.irs.gov/taxstats/article/0,,id=175807,00.html. 
Internal Revenue Service (1957-1997). Annual report of the commissioner and chief counsel of the 
Internal Revenue Service. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office. 
Internal Revenue Service (2003). Statistics of income. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government 
Printing Office. 
Klepper, S., Nagin, D. and Spurr, S. (1991). Tax rates, tax compliance, and the reporting of long 
term capital gains. Public Finance / Finances Publiques, 46(2), 236-251. 
Ledbetter, M. (2004). A comparison of BEA estimates of personal income and IRS estimates of 
adjusted gross income. Survey of Current Business, 84(4), 8-22. 
Musgrave, R.A. (1987). Short of euphoria. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1(1), 59-71. 
Ott, A.F., Vegari, S.B. (2003). Tax reform: Chasing the elusive dream. Atlantic Economic Journal, 
31(3), 266-282. 
Pestieau, P., Possen, U. and Slutsky, S. (1994). Optimal differential taxes and penalties. Public 
Finance / Finances Publiques, 49 (Supplement), 15-27. 
Sanger, G.C., Sirmans, C.F. and Turnbull, G.K. (1990). The effects of tax reform on real estate: 
Some empirical results. Land Economics, 66(4), 409-424.  
Spicer, M.W., Lundsted, S.B. (1976). Understanding tax evasion. Public Finance / Finances 
Publiques, 31(2), 295-305. 
Spicer, M.W., Thomas, J.E. (1982). Audit probabilities and the tax - evasion decision: An 
experimental approach. Journal of Economic Psychology, 2(2), 241-245.  
Tanzi, V. (1982). The underground economy in the United States and abroad. Lexington, MA: 
Lexington Books. 
Tanzi, V. (1983). The underground economy in the United States: Annual estimates, 1930-1980. 
IMF Staff Papers, 30(2), 283 - 305. 
13 
 
 13 
Thurman, Q.C. (1991). Taxpayer noncompliance and general prevention: An expansion of the 
deterrence model. Public Finance / Finances Publiques, 46(2), 289-298. 
U.S. Census Bureau (1994). Statistical abstract of the United States, 1994. Washington, D.C.: U.S 
Government Printing Office.. 
U.S. Census Bureau (1998). Statistical abstract of the United States, 1998. Washington, D.C.: U.S 
Government Printing Office.. 
U.S. Census Bureau (1999). Statistical abstract of the United States, 1999. Washington, D.C.: U.S 
Government Printing Office. 
U.S. Census Bureau (2001). Statistical abstract of the United States, 2001. Washington, D.C.: U.S 
Government Printing Office. 
U.S. Census Bureau (2010). Statistical abstract of the United States, 2010. Washington, D.C.: U.S 
Government Printing Office. 
Yaniv, G. (1994). Tax evasion and the income tax rate: A theoretical examination. Public Finance / 
Finances Publiques, 49(1), 107-112.  
 
 
14 
 
 14 
Table 1. Expected Impacts of Variables on Aggregate Personal Income Tax Evasion 
 
Variable    Expected Impact on Aggregate Personal 
     Income Tax Evasion (+ or -) 
 
MAXMARGTX    + 
PCTITEM    + 
TFTEN     - 
IRAQWAR     + 
TRA      - 
AUDIT     - 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
15 
 
 15 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable   Mean  Standard Deviation 
Period: 1970-2008: 
 
(UAGI/RAGI)    21.013  2.027 
MAXMARGTX   48.157  15.73 
TRA    0.0513  0.224  
PCTITEM   31.863  3.692 
TFTEN   89.9  10.8 
AUDIT    1.362  0.4 
IRAQWAR   0.154  0.366 
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Table 3. Data for Dependent Variable, UAGI/RAGI, by Year, 1960-2008 
 
Year UAGI/RAGI   Year UAGI/RAGI 
1960 16.10    1985 21.11 
1961 15.47    1986 18.89 
1962 15.86    1987 17.42 
1963 16.44    1988 18.74 
1964 15.88    1989 21.06 
1965 14.62    1990 21.06 
1966 14.86    1991 21.39 
1967 15.36    1992 19.04 
1968 15.21    1993 17.70 
1969 15.32    1994 17.98 
1970 16.30    1995 20.01 
1971 16.04    1996 18.64 
1972 16.16    1997 18.66 
1973 16.27    1998 18.30 
1974 17.47    1999 20.55 
1975 18.81    2000 22.29 
1976 20.17    2001 22.73 
1977 20.37    2002 23.94 
1978 20.63    2003 23.17 
1979 21.14    2004 21.57 
1980 22.84    2005 21.98 
1981 22.25    2006 23.85 
1982 22.93    2007 24.90 
1983 21.46    2008 23.94 
1984 21.86 
 
UAGI/RAGI is expressed as a percentage. 
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Table 4. Empirical Estimates, 1970-2008 
 
Variable  (UAGI/RAGI) log (UAGI/RAGI) log (UAGI/RAGI) 
   (a)   (b)   (c) 
Specification  OLS  OLS   OLS 
             (Linear)  (Semi-log)  (Log-Log) 
a0   24.85  3.22   1.36  
 
MAXMARGTX  0.088*** 0.0043***  0.106*    
   (2.89)  (2.90)   (2.11) 
 
PCTITEM  0.189*  0.009*   0.356** 
   (2.13)  (2.07)   (2.62) 
 
TFTEN  -10.97*** -0.521***  -0.594*** 
   (-2.83)  (-2.79)   (-3.56) 
 
TRA   -4.497*** -0.222***  -0.206*** 
   (-3.88)  (-3.92)   (-3.87) 
 
IRAQWAR  2.652*** 0.124***  0.118*** 
   (3.25)  (3.12)   (3.21) 
 
AUDIT   -3.358*** -0.1604***  -0.171*** 
   (-3.18)  (-3.11)   (-3.46) 
 
R2   0.70  0.69   0.72 
AdjR2   0.63  0.62   0.65 
F   9.76*** 9.41***  10.47*** 
DW   1.77  1.74   1.89 
Rho   0.11  0.10   0.05 
 
Terms in parentheses are t-values. ***indicates statistical significance at the one percent level; 
**indicates statistical significance at the 2.5 percent level; *indicates statistical significance at the 
five percent level.  
